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RETHINKING RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING: SOLVING
THE PROBLEM OF ADJUDICATIVE DEFERENCE
Gwendolyn Savitz *
INTRODUCTION
The Chevron doctrine enables courts to defer to authoritative,
legally binding agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.1
Though more frequently applied when reviewing rulemaking, the
doctrine is actually more powerful when applied to an adjudication.
In an adjudication, the agency can attach consequences to past actions made before the interpretation announced in the adjudication
itself. Since such a determination will receive deference on review,
this declaration effectively becomes a new rule, having gone
through neither public notice or public comment. Not only does it
become a new rule, it becomes a new rule that is effective retroactively.
It is illogical to have a system that gives more power to a less
democratic process, and Chevron deference should therefore not
apply to adjudication.
The notice and comment process that Chevron more typically defers to is the best method yet devised to enable an agency to benefit
from not only its own expertise but that of the general interested
public as well. Public comment can point out potential problems
with the agency’s preferred approach that the agency has not otherwise foreseen as well as present solutions not yet considered by
the agency.
This type of input could be beneficial for ambiguities that come
to light in an adjudication as well as those initially addressed in
rulemaking. Agencies should therefore be encouraged to undertake
rulemakings when ambiguities arise in adjudications. But because
of the retroactive nature of adjudication itself, these rules would
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D. American University Washington College of Law, L.L.M. Yale Law School.
1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

1239

1240

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1239

need to (at least potentially) be used retroactively in the adjudication that gave rise to them, or there would be no incentive for the
agency to undertake the delay and effort of the rulemaking.
This Article argues that not only should adjudications not receive Chevron deference, but a limited exception should also be created to the current ban on retroactive rulemaking to encourage
agencies to engage in the rulemaking process to address ambiguities arising in adjudication. This exception could be specifically
cabined to apply only in these unique situations. Enabling such an
exception would provide the agency and the public with the benefits arising from public participation.
I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE IS A CRITICAL PART OF THE MODERN
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Chevron deference forms the foundation of the modern administrative state. While in Part III this Article argues why Chevron
deference should not be available when reviewing the results of an
agency adjudication, it is not intended to discount the continuing
importance of Chevron. This section begins by explaining what
Chevron deference is before providing the reasons generally given
for Chevron deference and finally ends by explaining what happens
to agency decisions that are not entitled to Chevron deference.
A. What Chevron Deference Means
Chevron deference refers to the discretion potentially granted to
an agency’s legal interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering.2
Not every agency determination is entitled to Chevron deference. The agency must have engaged in sufficiently formal procedures when formulating the determination, as discussed in section
II.A.1, and even then, deference is only granted provided certain
conditions are met.

2. The distinction that it must be an agency’s legal interpretation rather than an
agency’s factual finding is because Chevron deference applies only to questions of law rather
than questions of fact, a distinction that is traditionally used in appellate review. See Nicholas J. Leddy, Determining Due Deference: Examining When Courts Should Defer to Agency
Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 877–79 (2007); see also
Cheruku v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 662 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2011) (reciting the standard for
review of questions of law).
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Chevron was initially formulated as a two-part test.3 In part one
of the test, the court determines whether the statute is ambiguous—that is, whether the claimed ambiguous word or phrase is in
fact ambiguous or should instead be interpreted in only one way.4
When making this determination, the court is to use all available
tools of statutory interpretation, as it normally would when interpreting a statute.5
If the court concludes during this part one analysis that the statute is ambiguous—it has been unable to discern the true meaning
of Congress using the traditional tools of statutory construction—
the analysis moves to step two.
In step two, the court determines whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.6 To be reasonable, the agency’s interpretation
must fall within the zone of ambiguity created by the statute.7 If
the agency interpretation is reasonable, it is upheld, even if it
would not have been the court’s preferred interpretation.8
While Chevron was initially formulated as a two-step test, some
courts add an additional preliminary analysis, often referred to as
step zero.9 During this analysis the court determines whether the
statute in question actually delegates authority to the agency to
make the determination at issue.10 While often not explicitly part
of the Chevron analysis (and therefore only a determination that
the statute implicitly does grant such authority), it is still referred
to as part of the Chevron test since determining that no discretion
was granted to the agency is a way for courts to avoid the remainder of the analysis altogether in cases where it might otherwise
have been expected to apply.11 This can make a big difference, since

3. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 843 & n.9.
6. Id. at 844–45.
7. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–16 (2019).
8. Velásquez-García v. Holder, 760 F.3d 571, 578 (7th Cir. 2014).
9. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). The
term “step zero” itself originated with Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836, 873 (2001).
10. Gallardo v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We begin at Chevron Step
Zero, where we determine ‘whether the Chevron framework applies at all.’” (quoting Or.
Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v. Perez, 816 F.3d 1080, 1086 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2016)).
11. See Michael Dorf, The Triumph of Chevron Step Zero?, DORF ON L. (July 27, 2015),
https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/07/the-triumph-of-chevron-step-zero.html [https://perma.
cc/UX2U-R36G] (describing cases where the Court would have been expected to side with
the agency and yet still appeared to decide the case at the step zero stage).
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when a court applies Chevron the agency action is generally upheld, particularly when the analysis reaches step two.12
Chevron deference, then, is a very deferential approach to
agency statutory interpretation that is granted only when the
court reaches step two of the Chevron test and has determined that
the statute is ambiguous.
B. Reasons for Chevron Deference
Three main reasons are given for Chevron deference: separation
of powers drawing from the Constitution and the corresponding
comparative political accountability; the comparative expertise of
the agency; and the increased efficiency and predictability if the
law remains uniform throughout the country. This section discusses these factors beginning with the most important in the mind
of Justice Scalia, the most vocal supporter of Chevron—the separation of powers, followed by agency expertise, and finally, legal
predictability.
1. Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
The primary argument made in Chevron itself was that it upholds the separation of powers required by the Constitution.13
The Constitution allocates authority among the three branches
of government. Congress, the legislative branch, is to “make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
12. Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
767, 796–97 (2008) (noting the high rate at which agency action was upheld in general and
particularly once the result reached step two, but noting that the rate of reversal at step one
indicated that courts that may have otherwise determined the statute was unambiguously
in favor of the agency’s interpretation found it easier to carry the analysis through step two).
13. Interestingly, one of the most common complaints raised by those who oppose Chevron is that it violates the separation of powers by not requiring the judiciary to make the
final determination on what the law means. E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761–62
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Interpreting federal statutes—including ambiguous ones
administered by an agency—‘calls for that exercise of independent judgment.’ Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising that judgment, forcing them to abandon what they
believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor of an agency’s construction. It
thus wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is’ and
hands it over to the Executive. Such a transfer is in tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause,
which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts, not administrative agencies.”
(citations omitted)). This misunderstands that the second step of Chevron means a court is
not faced with meaning it can determine, that was the question in the first step, but with
what is the best option available given this ambiguity. That is no longer what the law means
but what the law should mean, which is a policy decision for the executive branch.
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Execution” its specifically enumerated powers.14 The President, as
head of the executive branch, shall “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”15 And the courts, as members of the judicial
branch, oversee “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States.”16
While the final directive to the courts is not as specific as the
other two, the Court clarified in Marbury v. Madison that constitutionally it was the courts rather than the other branches that
were to have the final say on what the law meant.17 This decision
made the courts the final authority on legal issues while explicitly
removing them from the political questions faced by other
branches. This division is considered so fundamental that the
courts will not consider cases that are deemed to involve a political
question, reasoning that such issues are not properly the domain
of the courts but rather that of the other branches.18
The structure of Chevron helps make this distinction clear. In
step one, the court is trying to determine what the law means.19 If
such a determination is made, the court, as the final arbiter of what
the law means, is constitutionally obligated to use that interpretation.20
When a court is unable to determine what Congress meant in
step one, that means that the remaining question is no longer what
the law means, but rather what the best policy choice should be,
and such decisions are delegated to other branches.21 A related
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17. 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”).
18. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1292 (11th Cir.
2009) (finding that even asking the military for money damages in a negligence case would
force the courts into the domain of another branch).
19. See discussion supra section I.A.
20. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. This also allows the Chevron doctrine to align with the
general assumption that questions of law should receive de novo review. To the extent that
the court determines the question is one properly dealt with first by the court, determining
what the law means is effectively de novo review. It is only once the analysis proceeds to
part two, where the court is no longer trying to determine what the law actually means (the
goal of de novo review) but rather the best policy option that deference is granted to the
agency. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 391 (1999) (“De novo proceedings
presume a foundation of law. The question here is whether the regulations are part of that
controlling law. Deference can be given to the regulations without impairing the authority
of the court to make factual determinations, and to apply those determinations to the law,
de novo.”).
21. Cf. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (declining to defer to the
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argument is that it makes sense for the courts, which are not accountable to the public through any electoral system, to defer to
the branches that do have to answer to the public.22 As the Court
said in Chevron:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision,
fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left
open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do.23

Some have argued that agencies are really a fourth branch of
government.24 However, executive agencies fall within the oversight of the President.25 And this is not merely nominal. Changes
in administration mean changes in the high-level personnel within
an agency, the people who are put in place to help guide the goals
of the president.26 Major decisions of agencies also must be approved by the Office of Management and Budget, an office that exists explicitly to exert presidential oversight over agency action.27

executive branch when it had separately argued both sides of an issue since that went
against any political rational for deference to the executive).
22. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hargan, 285 F. Supp. 3d 351, 370–71 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Because the phrase ‘fairly respond’ is ambiguous, Chevron teaches that Congress ‘has implicitly delegated the authority’ to interpret this term to the FDA. That conclusion is particularly apt, moreover, because—as this case demonstrates—the meaning attached to that
phrase implicates the type of policy-laden judgment that is better left to the politically accountable executive branch than to the unelected judiciary.” (citation omitted)).
23. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
24. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984). Some treat all agencies as members of the fourth branch, while others focus more specifically on independent agencies. Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216, 1219 (1983) (White,
J., dissenting) (referring to independent agencies as a fourth branch).
25. Seila L., L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020) (“While
we need not and do not revisit our prior decisions allowing certain limitations on the President’s removal power, there are compelling reasons not to extend those precedents to the
novel context of an independent agency led by a single Director. Such an agency lacks a
foundation in historical practice and clashes with constitutional structure by concentrating
power in a unilateral actor insulated from Presidential control.”). The Court follows Seila
the following year when it held a provision limiting the removal of the head of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency was also invalid. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1783–84 (2021)
(“The Recovery Act’s for-cause restriction on the President’s removal authority violates the
separation of powers. Indeed, our decision last Term in Seila Law is all but dispositive.”).
26. On June 23, 2021, the day that Collins v. Yellen was issued, President Biden removed the head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency to instead install his own pick.
Matthew Goldstein, Adam Liptak & Jim Tankersley, Biden Removes Chief of Housing
Agency After Supreme Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/06/23/us/biden-housing-agency-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/N94X-M2PJ].
27. Office of Management and Budget, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb [https://perma.cc/KQ4M-YE4Q] (“The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) serves
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This distinction becomes important because agency actions and
interpretations can and do change with a change in administration.28 Despite occasional language indicating otherwise,29 Chevron
specifically allows an agency to change its interpretation of a statute, meaning that the agency interpretation can be more directly
responsive to the will of the people as expressed in their choice of
president.30
2. Expertise
While the constitutional aspect of political accountability described in the prior section provides a systemic reason to defer, the
fact that the agency is likely in a better position than the court to
be making the final determination is another important rationale
for Chevron.
Agency employees are highly trained in specialized areas and
often spend their entire professional careers working within one
specific area.31 Courts, on the other hand, are generalists in most
areas.32

the President of the United States in overseeing the implementation of his or her vision
across the Executive Branch. OMB’s mission is to assist the President in meeting policy,
budget, management, and regulatory objectives and to fulfill the agency’s statutory responsibilities.”). It is OMB that is responsible for many of the requirements that make rulemaking so burdensome for agencies as discussed in section II.A.1.
28. Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Deference to Inconsistent
Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 91 (2011) (“[C]hanges in an agency’s
interpretive position may reflect changes in the agency’s political priorities—often triggered
by a change in the presidential administration.”).
29. OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 921 F. Supp. 812, 824 & n.11 (D.D.C. 1996),
aff’d, 132 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[A preamble could] be considered for Chevron purposes
in deciding whether the agency has had a consistent and long-standing interpretation of a
statute.”).
30. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82
(2005) (“‘On the contrary, the agency . . . must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis,’ for example, in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations.” (citations omitted)).
31. Jarrod Shobe, Agencies As Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies
in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 499 (2017) (“[T]he vast majority of
agency staffers are career employees who spend the bulk of their career working for one
agency.”). In the Article, which included quotes from direct interviews with agency employees, one employee stated, “[p]eople like it here and have an interest in the agency’s mission,
so they tend to stick around.” Id.
32. Courts would, however, be considered to have greater expertise in interpreting
criminal statutes than an agency would. United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014)
(“[W]e have never held that the Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to
any deference.”).
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And it is not merely the knowledge of the individuals at the
agency that go into many agency decisions. The type of decisions
most likely to get deference are those where the agency has had its
views tested in some way, whether through an adverse proceeding
or, more commonly, by soliciting the feedback of the general public
in the comment process.33
In addition to formal measures like the comment process, agencies also routinely reach out to third parties for feedback when formulating policy in the early stages of the rulemaking process.34 All
of this means that the final agency determination is not merely the
agency’s initial thoughts on the matter but rather the result of a
reasoned process.
The fact that there are political dimensions to many of the decisions does not eliminate the need for informed actors to play a role
in the determinations. Chevron also answers the question of who
is better prepared to interpret the data generated during the review process. As has been stated, between the agency and the
court, the agency is in the superior position given its greater expertise to be making specific determinations within the discretion
delegated by Congress.
There is one final rational to Chevron, one that has become increasingly obvious as cases have played out in the courts. Chevron
leads to greater uniformity in decisions among the circuits, as explained in the next section.
3. Predictability
The final reason why Chevron deference is important is because
it provides greater predictability for laws that are intended to be
applicable nationwide.
Because Chevron only applies when the statute is determined to
be ambiguous,35 Chevron applications are going to be cases where
courts would likely otherwise go in different directions, as different
circuits would not be expected to interpret an ambiguous statute
33. The different types of administrative action are discussed in greater detail in sections II.A.1 and II.B.1.
34. Gwendolyn McKee Savitz, The Key to Solving Agency Lock-in: Prepublication Regulatory Discussions (Pre Reg), 73 ADMIN. L. REV. 255, 259 (2021) (“The agency often reaches
out to groups it knows will be interested in the regulation and solicits their input ahead of
time. Interest groups know this is the most critical time to be in contact with the agency,
and those with connections often can be.”).
35. The Chevron analysis is described in section I.A.
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in an identical manner.36 These are therefore the cases where a law
deferring to uniformity will make the largest difference. Or, as Justice Scalia noted in 2013, “Thirteen Courts of Appeals applying a
totality-of-circumstances test would render the binding effect of
agency rules unpredictable and destroy the whole stabilizing purpose of Chevron.”37
Much of our legal system functions perfectly well with different
rules that apply in different locations. Oregon, for instance, can use
a modified comparative negligence standard,38 while its next-door
neighbor, Washington, can use a pure comparative negligence
standard.39 In this instance, an Oregon attorney can use the Oregon law to warn a potential client who would be more than fifty
percent at fault that they would be unlikely to recover, without
having to consider that the result would be different had it happened on the other side of the Columbia River. But, there are different concerns when everything must be regulated by a national
organization.
An agency will have a substantially harder time regulating the
broader public when different laws apply in different circuits.40
And, in many instances, it will be required to apply different laws
in order to eventually be able to seek higher review. If one circuit
decides to go against an agency, for the agency to even have a realistic chance of having that opinion reviewed in the Supreme

36. For example, this series of cases regarding whether to defer to the BIA on sexual
abuse of minors demonstrates the inconsistencies in the various circuits’ approaches. Some
courts explicitly deferred to the agency under Chevron. See, e.g., Velasco-Giron v. Holder,
773 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 2014); Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1024–25 (6th
Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017); Mugalli v.
Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2001). Other courts did not apply Chevron and did not
uphold the agency’s interpretation. See, e.g., Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512, 520 (4th Cir.
2015); Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008). Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held that the statute was unambiguous. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137
S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (“We have no need to resolve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron
receives priority in this case because the statute, read in context, unambiguously forecloses
the Board’s interpretation.”).
37. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013).
38. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.600 (2021) (looking at whether “the fault attributable to the
claimant was not greater than the combined fault of all” other parties).
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (2021) (“[A]ny contributory fault chargeable to the
claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an
injury . . . .”).
40. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1296
(2016) (“By giving agencies the discretion to choose among several ‘reasonable’ interpretations of an ambiguous statute, the Chevron test reduced geographic differences in the interpretation of national statutes by reducing the number of splits among the circuits produced
by circuit court applications of the less deferential Skidmore test.”).
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Court of the United States, it must continue to fight similar challenges in all other circuits, as the Court will generally not even
take an issue until multiple circuits are in conflict.41 This means
that the agency must continue enforcing different laws in different
places before it can realistically seek review.
We have known for decades how much harder it is for an organization to function when different laws apply in different states.
Creating uniformity among state laws was one of the underlying
purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code back in the 1950s.42
The fact that those challenging the agency action must overcome
this deferential review helps ensure that the law is uniform, provided the agency has indeed stayed within the zone of ambiguity
created by the statute.43 Granting deference to agencies when they
are acting within congressionally delegated discretion helps ensure
that laws intended to apply to the entire country do not splinter
into unique laws in each circuit since agency action reviewed in
cases entitled to Chevron will likely receive deference and be upheld.
The discussion thus far has centered on when and why courts
grant agencies Chevron deference. But, not every agency determination is analyzed using Chevron. The next section discusses what
happens to agency determinations that do not qualify for the Chevron analysis.
C. Skidmore—the Alternative to Chevron Deference
Agency interpretations that are not entitled to Chevron deference instead receive what is generally referred to as Skidmore44 or
Mead45 deference.

41. Max Huffman, Judge Painter’s Forty Rules: A Review of Judge Mark Painter, the
Legal Writer: 40 Rules for the Art of Legal Writing (2d ed. 2003), 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1011,
1015 & n.28 (2004) (book review) (“In Supreme Court litigation, multiple citations may be
required to demonstrate the depth of a circuit split, warranting a grant of certiorari.”).
42. Stephen P. Tarolli, Comment, The Future of Information Commerce Under Contemporary Contract and Copyright Principles, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1639, 1646 (1997) (stating that
the code was created in 1951 but it was not until 1968 that it had been adopted by all states
other than Louisiana). See also the third stated purpose in the UCC itself. U.C.C. § 1103(a)(3) (AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2020) (“[T]o make uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions.”).
43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
44. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
45. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). While this type of deference
is referred to using both terms, I will use Skidmore as that was the case cited in Mead itself
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The Skidmore analysis does not proceed in a series of steps like
Chevron but instead provides the court with a variety of factors to
consider when determining whether or not to defer to an agency
interpretation.46 More specifically, deference “will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control.”47
Given the degree to which the court is tasked to analyze the
agency’s action, Skidmore deference can really be thought of as a
requirement that the agency convince the court that its position is
correct. But the agency’s argument is not merely made in a brief,
and, in fact, can be disregarded if made for the first time in a
brief.48 Instead, the main factors available to the agency to convince the court are factors within the control of the agency earlier
in the process. For instance, a longstanding interpretation will receive greater deference than a recent change.49 This is a choice at
odds with Chevron, which grants agencies leeway to change statutory interpretations.50 The reasoning used in the decision itself will
also be an important factor in Skidmore review, rather than the
degree to which the determination can be justified at a later
point.51
Given the degree to which the court is directed to scrutinize the
agency’s activity and reasoning in Skidmore review, it is not really
for the level of deference. Id. at 227–28. Mead itself was an important case because it had
not been totally clear until that point (more than fifteen years after Chevron was decided)
that not every agency interpretation would be automatically entitled to deference, so Mead
effectively resurrected Skidmore. Id. at 240–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
47. Id.
48. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 156 (1991)
(“Our decisions indicate that agency ‘litigating positions’ are not entitled to deference when
they are merely appellate counsel’s ‘post hoc rationalizations’ for agency action, advanced
for the first time in the reviewing court.”).
49. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
857 & n.130 (2001) (noting that this factor predates even Skidmore, since “nineteenth century justices recognized the importance of respecting certain longstanding and consistent
executive branch interpretations of statutes.”).
50. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984) (“The
fact that the EPA has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term ‘source’ does
not lead to the conclusion that no deference should be accorded the EPA’s interpretation of
the statute. An agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”).
51. Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir. 2005). The Packard
court refused to grant deference to an agency letter because “[t]he materials at issue here
simply provide no reasoning or analysis that a court could properly find persuasive.” Id.
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correct to call this a form of deference.52 Instead, the court is upholding an agency interpretation it has independently found persuasive.
The distinction between Chevron and Skidmore becomes most
relevant when the court disagrees with the agency’s determination. Analyzed under Skidmore, the agency’s action would not be
upheld as the court would instead insert its preferred interpretation, having found the agency’s argument unpersuasive.53 But, analyzed under Chevron, if the agency action was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, the court would have to uphold
it, even if the court disagreed.54
Chevron deference, then, can require a court to uphold an interpretation with which it disagrees, while Skidmore requires the
agency to convince the court its view is correct. Currently, determinations that were made in both rulemakings and adjudications
are potentially eligible for Chevron, as described in Part II, although if adjudication were no longer eligible for Chevron deference,
as argued for in Part III, they would instead be analyzed under
Skidmore.
II. CHEVRON IS CURRENTLY USED WHEN REVIEWING BOTH
RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION
Chevron originated in a rulemaking case but was very quickly
used when reviewing agency adjudications as well. That does not
mean that the two types of agency action are equivalent, however.
This Part begins by describing in more detail what agency rulemaking entails. It then provides two examples of judicial review of
rulemaking using Chevron. The pattern is then repeated for adjudication, starting with an explanation of the process before providing two examples of judicial review of adjudication using Chevron.

52. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1467 & n.155 (2005) (“[T]he phrase Skidmore ‘deference’ is misleading. A court granting Skidmore deference does not actually relinquish interpretive power to
the agency but recognizes the agency as a kind of expert witness, particularly useful in
rendering its own interpretive judgment.”).
53. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
54. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.

2022]

RETHINKING RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING

1251

A. Reviewing Rulemaking with Chevron
This section begins with an overview of rulemaking—the most
common type of agency action reviewed using Chevron, before
providing examples of Chevron review in action in both the Supreme Court and a circuit court.
1. An Overview of Rulemaking
Rulemaking is defined by the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) as the “agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”55 A rule, in turn, is “the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of
an agency.”56
The term “rule” can encompass documents that are understood
not to be legally binding, like a guidance document, as well as the
formal codification of legally binding requirements created by an
agency—a regulation.57
While rulemaking technically refers to the process by which any
rule is created, it is used generally and in this Article more specifically as a shorthand to refer to the primary way that agencies create regulations—notice and comment rulemaking.58 This distinction matters because Chevron deference is available only for legally
binding agency determinations.59 For rules, this translates to those
55. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
56. Id. § 551(4).
57. Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 263,
266 (2018) (describing the distinction between regulations (legislative rules) and guidance
documents (nonlegislative rules)).
58. Notice and comment rulemaking is not the only method of rulemaking possible—
formal rulemaking is also an option. However, due to the significantly increased time commitment required for formal rulemaking compared to informal rulemaking, other than the
few instances where it is explicitly required by a statute, it is not voluntarily used for rulemaking. Gwendolyn McKee Savitz, Public Comments Run Amok: Reforming the Notice and
Comment Process to Help Reduce the Negative Effects of Mass and Fake Comments, 69 BUFF.
L. REV. 759, 762–63 (2021) (“Informal rulemaking is informal in the same way that black
tie is informal. It’s not, unless one compares it to white tie. White tie here is equivalent to
formal rulemaking both in its increased level of formality and its rarity in modern society.”).
59. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example,
. . . notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”).
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rules issued after notice and comment.60 Rules issued through
other means, like guidance documents, do not qualify for Chevron
deference and instead are analyzed under Skidmore.61
Notice and comment rulemaking starts when an agency makes
a determination that a rule is needed in a particular area. This
determination may be made because a statute has commanded the
agency to undertake rulemaking over a certain issue, or because
the agency has determined that further regulation in an area is
needed.62
If the rule the agency is considering is determined to be significant, most frequently because it is expected to have an annual impact on the economy of more than $100 million, the proposed rule
must receive the approval of the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”).63 As described in section II.A.1, OMB is the means by
which the President exercises greater oversight of agency action.64
OMB requires that economically significant rules be submitted
with a regulatory impact statement.65 This statement must describe the approach chosen as well as alternatives considered and
the costs of each approach.66 It must also demonstrate why the approach chosen is justified.67
Once the agency has OMB approval, the agency is then able to
publish the proposed rule in the Federal Register, the

60. Id.
61. See discussion supra section I.C.
62. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING
PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2013), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL32240.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V6JR-NBSE] (“An initiating event (e.g., a recommendation from an outside body or a catastrophic accident) can prompt either legislation or regulation (where regulatory action has
already been authorized).”).
63. While the $100 million trigger is the most common, there are other ways an action
can be significant. It could also “adversely affect in a material way the economy,” “[c]reate
a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another
agency,” “[m]aterially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements . . . or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof,” or “[r]aise novel legal or policy issues.” Exec. Order No. 12,866,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993).
64. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
65. The requirements are set out in a guidance document created by OMB. OFF. OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 1–
3 (2003), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars
/a004/a-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/RXV5-6T8J].
66. OFF. MGMT & BUDGET, AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 1
(2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/inforeg/in
foreg/regpol/RIA_Checklist.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4ZJ-625Q].
67. Id. at 1, 3 n.10.
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government’s official method of public notification.68 The published
document includes the text of the rule as well as a preamble that
explains the reasoning behind the agency’s choice.69 If applicable,
this reasoning also includes other options that were considered and
why the agency made the choice it did.70
Publication of the rule marks the beginning of what is generally
a thirty- or sixty-day comment period during which anyone in the
world is able to comment on the agency’s approach.71 While many
rules receive no comment, rules on particularly hot button issues
can receive millions of comments.72
The comments received are then reviewed by the agency, often
after outside contractors have sorted and compiled them if a large
number are submitted.73 The comments do not function as votes,
and the agency is not required to follow the will of the comments,74
but the agency must consider all significant points raised in the
comments.75 This is the opportunity for the public to point out potential problems with a rule that the agency has not yet considered
and to do so before legally binding rules are issued.
The agency then makes any changes the agency feels are necessary after reviewing the comments.76 As long as the final version
is considered a logical outgrowth77 of the proposed rule, the agency
68. Amy Bunk, Federal Register 101, 67 PROCEEDINGS 55, 55 (2010).
69. Id. at 56.
70. Id. at 56–57.
71. OFF. OF THE FED. REG., A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2011),
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/T6C2-4HL7] (stating that the time can extend to 180 days for particularly complex rulemakings).
72. See, e.g., Savitz, supra note 58, at 766 (pointing out the large number of comments
submitted to the second net neutrality rulemaking that were later determined to be fake).
73. Jennifer Nou, The FCC Just Received a Million Net-Neutrality Comments.
Here’s What It’s Like to Sort Through Them All, WASH. POST. (July 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/07/18/the-fcc-just-received-a-mil
lion-net-neutrality-comments-heres-what-its-like-to-sort-through-them-all/ [https://perma.
cc/4M3C-KXGX] (“Practices among agencies vary, but in general, each comment is read and
coded by teams of agency staff members or contractors.”).
74. Id. (“[A]gencies can’t promulgate regulations by reference to how loudly the crowd
applauds.”).
75. Id. (referring to the process of sorting through the comments for the few significant
ones as “sifting for gold”).
76. See Michael Tingey Roberts, United States Food Law Update, 2 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y,
137, 145–46 (2006) (detailing changes made to an interim final rule issued by the Food and
Drug Administration.).
77. The logical outgrowth requirement mandates that the final rule be similar enough
to the proposed rule that the public could have determined whether there was something
they needed to respond to. See Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in
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can send the revised version and required analyses back to OMB
for a second review.78
After this version is approved by OMB the final rule is published
in the Federal Register. As before, the publication includes a preamble discussing the reasoning behind the rule, but, for the final
rule. this preamble must also discuss the significant comments received and the agency’s response to those comments.79
The significant qualifier is important, as many comments received are mass comments that are often devoid of true substance.80 Not only are these generally screened out before even
reaching the agency, they fail to raise the types of issues that an
agency would be required to respond to in the preamble.81
When the final rule (regulation) is published it also generally
includes an effective date.82 This date, by statute, may not be less
than thirty days away.83 An exception to this thirty-day requirement is available for the types of rules that are not required to undergo notice and comment rulemaking (and that consequently fail
to have the force of law)—interpretive rules and guidance documents.84
Some rules can be challenged immediately after publication,85
but often rules are not challenged until the agency has taken action
Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 216–17 (1996) (describing the origin of the requirement).
78. OMB Approval Process, DOD OPEN GOV’T, https://open.defense.gov/Regulatory-Program/Process/OMBApproval [https://perma.cc/Y93F-SFSV]; OFF. OF THE FED. REG., supra
note 71 (“In the same way that the President and the Office of Information & Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) review draft proposed rules prior to publication, the President and OIRA
analyze draft final rules when they are ‘significant’ due to economic effects or because they
raise important policy issues.”).
79. OFF. OF THE FED. REG., supra note 71; Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154
F.3d 455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“An agency must also demonstrate the rationality of its decision-making process by responding to those comments that are relevant and significant.”).
80. Savitz, supra note 58, at 769 (“Mass comments are generally not substantive because the arguments in mass comments are primarily policy-based, the least useful type of
comment from the agency perspective.”).
81. See id. at 769–70.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
83. Id.
84. § 553(d)(2).
85. The biggest hurdle faced by those attempting to challenge regulations immediately
after they have been enacted is ripeness. “The problem [of determining whether administrative action is ripe for judicial review] is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to
evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties
of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967),
abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). The fitness of the issue looks
primarily at the degree to which specific facts will be necessary to make a determination as
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against an individual or organization.86 A challenge can be procedural, like an argument that the agency did not properly consider
the comments received or the challenge can focus on the substance
of the agency’s rule.87 Chevron comes into play only when what is
at issue is the agency’s interpretation of the statute (a substantive
challenge), not whether the agency completed the required procedures.88 The following section details court review of agency action
analyzed using Chevron.
2. Examples of Rulemaking Review with Chevron
This section provides two examples of rulemaking review using
Chevron, starting with an older case at the Supreme Court and
then a more recent case from the Tenth Circuit.
a. Chevron Review of Rulemaking in the Supreme Court
The 2011 case of Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and
Research v. United States89 demonstrates how ambiguity can exist
in seemingly clear statutory text. Mayo dealt with whether the
Mayo Foundation (the employer) needed to pay taxes on money
paid to medical residents who were working fifty to eighty hour
weeks.90 The relevant statute required that employers pay taxes
“on the wages employees earn,” which defined “wages” to include
“all renumeration for employment” but excluded from taxation any
“service performed in the employ of . . . a school, college, or university . . . if such service is performed by a student who is enrolled
and regularly attending classes at such school, college, or university.”91 The Treasury Department, the agency in question, had long
interpreted the student exception to apply only to “students who
opposed to the degree to which the issue is purely legal. In the second factor the court looks
at whether “the impact of the regulations upon the petitioners is sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review at this stage.” Id. at 149, 152.
86. In many instances the individual would learn about the relevant regulation for the
first time after an enforcement action was brought, so this option also enables those who
were not previously aware of the regulation a chance to challenge it. See Stephen Hylas,
Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1644, 1650
(2017).
87. See NRDC. v. EPA, 961 F.3d 160, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]e evaluate their substantive challenge . . . under Chevron and their procedural challenge . . . under [Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)].”).
88. Id. at 170.
89. 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
90. Id. at 47–48.
91. Id. at 48–49 (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121).
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work for their schools ‘as an incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study.’”92
In an attempt at greater clarity, the Treasury Department finalized regulations regarding the restriction in 2004. These regulations stated “‘The services of a full-time employee’--as defined by
the employer’s policies, but in any event including any employee
normally scheduled to work forty hours or more per week--‘are not
incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study.’”93
The regulations also provided a number of examples of situations
that did and did not qualify, one of which was particularly relevant.
In Example 4, the regulations specifically address a medical resident, called E, stating that the medical resident’s “normal work
schedule, which includes services having an educational, instructional, or training aspect, is 40 hours or more per week.”94 Because
the forty hour requirement automatically made the resident a fulltime employee, the example stated that the conclusion was unaffected by “the fact that some of E’s services have an educational,
instructional, or training aspect”; and there is similarly no need to
consider “other relevant factors, such as whether E is a professional employee or whether E is eligible for employment benefits.”95
Mayo first attempted a Chevron step one claim, that the statute
unambiguously granted an exception for anyone substantially engaged in education and that the only restriction was the one in the
statute, that the students be regularly attending classes.96 However, Mayo was forced to concede that a professor who routinely
took an evening class each term would not predominately be a student.97 This concession meant that the statute could not simply be
interpreted as written and was ambiguous.98
The second step of the Chevon analysis was straightforward
once the Court determined that tax regulations were indeed entitled to Chevron deference rather than a less deferential tax-specific
standard.99 Mayo argued that it was inappropriate for the agency

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 49 (quoting 16 Fed. Reg. 12474 (adopting Treas. Regs. 127, § 408.219(c))).
Id. at 50 (quoting 26 C.F.R § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii) (2005)).
26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(e)(ii) (2022).
Id.
Mayo, 562 U.S. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55–56 (determining whether to follow Chevron or the test from Nat’l Muffler
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to categorically prohibit medical residents from ever qualifying for
the exception, but the Court said that:
Regulation, like legislation, often requires drawing lines. Mayo does
not dispute that the Treasury Department reasonably sought a way
to distinguish between workers who study and students who work. . . .
Focusing on the hours an individual works and the hours he spends
in studies is a perfectly sensible way of accomplishing that goal. The
Department explained that an individual’s service and his “course of
study are separate and distinct activities” in “the vast majority of
cases,” and reasoned that “employees who are working enough hours
to be considered full-time employees . . . have filled the conventional
measure of available time with work, and not study.”100

And it was not simply that this interpretation was reasonable;
the Court further explained that the agency’s conclusion was also
in line with Supreme Court precedent that tax exemptions be construed narrowly and the “rule takes into account the [Social Security Administration’s] concern that exempting residents from [the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act] would deprive residents and
their families of vital disability and survivorship benefits that Social Security provides.”101
Since the statute was ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation
was reasonable, the rule was upheld.102
b. Chevron Review of Rulemaking in the Circuit Courts
The second case, Big Horn Coal Co. v. Sadler, shows a more recent application of Chevron at the circuit court level.103 Big Horn
Coal dealt with a Department of Labor regulation interpreting a
section of the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”).104 As relevant,
the BLBA stated “Any claim for benefits by a miner under this section shall be filed within three years after . . . a medical determination of total disability due to pneumoconiosis.”105 In the relevant
regulation, the Department of Labor had added an exception to
this three-year time limit for “extraordinary circumstances.”106

Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979)).
100. Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 59–60.
102. Id. at 60.
103. 924 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2019).
104. Id. at 1318–19.
105. Id. at 1318 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 932(f)).
106. “[T]he time limits in section 932(f) ‘are mandatory and may not be waived or tolled
except upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances.’” Id.
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Edgar Sadler, a former miner, had received his official diagnosis
of total disability due to pneumoconiosis while in the middle of a
lengthy appeal of a prior denial of partial disability.107 Two years
and nine months after the diagnosis and under the advice of counsel, the miner withdrew his partial disability claim to file a total
disability claim.108 When the claim was withdrawn, the hearing
judge told the miner that the judge “believe[d] that [the miner] understands that he has now time to gather additional medical evidence—more current, more recent medical evidence—and that he
knows that he has the opportunity to file another, subsequent
claim.”109 Based on this understanding, the judge allowed the
miner to withdraw his initial claim.110
The miner’s second claim, however, was not filed until two years
after the withdrawal hearing, making it nearly five years after the
initial determination of total disability.111 This claim was filed
without the assistance of counsel.112
The new claim was granted and appealed to the same administrative law judge who had heard the previous case.113 While the
judge noted that the time had indeed run, the judge also said that
the combination of the apparently poor assistance provided by the
miner’s attorney and the judge’s own statement that the miner
would have additional time to file constituted sufficiently exceptional circumstances to toll the filing deadline.114
Under the arguments validly before the appellate court,115 the
case turned on whether the regulation allowing the option of tolling
the time was valid.116 This, in turn, depended for the first part of
the Chevron analysis on whether the statutory language, which
made no mention of an exception to the time requirement, could
still be considered ambiguous.117 After determining that there was
107. Id. at 1320.
108. Id. at 1320–21.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1321.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The mining company had also argued that the advice the judge had given to Sadler
should not be sufficient to count as extraordinary circumstances, but the court did not consider this argument since the company had not exhausted it before the Benefits Review
Board. Id. at 1325.
116. See id. at 1322.
117. Id. at 1322–23.

2022]

RETHINKING RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING

1259

nothing in the text of the statute itself or the legislative history
answering the question one way or the other, the court declared
the statute ambiguous.118
When determining whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, as required in Chevron’s second step, the court relied on
the implicit presumption119 in favor of equitable tolling to find that
the agency’s determination to retain such a presumption was reasonable.120
Since the statute was ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation
was reasonable, the rule was upheld.121
B. Reviewing Adjudications with Chevron
This section begins by describing what adjudication is before
providing two examples of judicial review of adjudication using
Chevron.

118. Id.
119. How to treat presumptions within the Chevron analysis is not entirely clear. Particularly since many presumptions would normally be used by a court in interpreting a statute, but might not qualify as the “cannons of statutory construction” that courts are to use
in Chevron step one. See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron
Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 571–72 (2003) (“The assertion that judges should consider substantive canons in the Chevron analysis raises the question of how they should be
considered. The most sensible approach would be to integrate substantive canons into the
Chevron framework as consistently with their normal usage as possible. Clear statement
rules should therefore displace Chevron deference, non-clear statement presumptions
should be utilized in Step One, and tiebreakers should be utilized in Step Two.”). It does,
however, seem somewhat incongruous to find that it was merely reasonable for an agency
to retain a presumption when no such argument was presented against doing it.
Finding that a presumption operates at Chevron step one versus Chevron step two can
have significant consequences later, since when a court has decided an issue at step two, an
agency may later come back and revise its view on the subject. If, however, the decision
occurred at step one that is the court saying what the law should permanently mean and
prevents the agency from making changes past that point.
In both this case and the prior case, the applicable court appeared to agree with the agency
action, but nevertheless proceeded to step two before declaring the result, which would allow
the agency to later go against the court’s preferred interpretation.
120. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Sadler, 924 F.3d 1317, 1324 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Second, it was
reasonable for the Secretary to interpret the BLBA to allow the limitations period to be
tolled in extraordinary circumstances because the Supreme Court has stated that nonjurisdictional federal statutes of limitations are ‘normally subject to a “rebuttable presumption”
in favor “of equitable tolling.”’”) (quoting Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 (2010)).
121. See id. at 1324–25.
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1. An Overview of Adjudication
An adjudication is the “agency process for the formulation of an
order.”122 An order, in turn, “means the whole or a part of a final
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but
including licensing.”123 Since the term order is defined in opposition to a rule, an adjudication is the opposite of a rulemaking. More
specifically, an adjudication is generally focused on the specific actions of a single individual or entity as opposed to rulemaking,
which is generally addressing broadly applicable issues.124
Also not clear from the definition is that adjudication differs
from rulemaking in that it generally addresses issues or actions
that have already occurred, even if there will still be a potential
future effect of those actions.125 The order resulting from an adjudication therefore generally analyzes the past actions of a specific
individual.
However, this does not mean that adjudications do not have a
future effect, even a broadly applicable future effect. In many instances agencies follow a common law approach to legal issues arising in an adjudication, where the administrative judge will reference a prior adjudicatory decision when determining the legal
outcome in another case.126
Just as the broad category of rulemaking ranges from regulations to unilaterally issued agency guidance documents,127 adjudication covers everything from a trial-like process to regulatory

122. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7).
123. Id. § 551(6).
124. Neustar, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 857 F.3d 886, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“We
reiterate that adjudications by nature are likely to be specific to individuals or entities,
while rules tend to be matters of more general application.”).
125. Safari Club Int’l v. Zinke, 878 F.3d 316, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[R]ules generally
have only ‘future effect’ while adjudications immediately bind parties by retroactively applying law to their past actions.”).
126. While the common law foundation of our legal system makes this seem nearly inevitable—of course cases will come up where legal issues were not worked out ahead of time—
that creates a false analogy between courts and agency adjudications. Courts have only one
method of action—they can decide cases. Agencies are not similarly constrained since they
generally have access to both rulemaking and adjudication options. The inevitability with
which such actions are viewed in a courtroom therefore need not translate to the agency
context.
127. See rulemaking discussion supra section II.A.1.
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letters issued to an individual alleging the violation of a particular
statute or regulation.128
The terminology is different, however. The rulemaking spectrum
goes from formal rulemaking on one end, through informational
(notice and comment) rulemaking and continues on to the issuance
of documents that would be categorized as rules rather than orders
but that are not otherwise referred to as the product of a rulemaking, like guidance documents.129
In adjudication, the spectrum only goes from formal to informal
adjudication, with a very large percentage of the spectrum considered informal. This is because formal adjudication must follow a
number of specific requirements130 and many adjudications have
some, but not all, of the formal protections.131 While an informal
(notice and comment) rulemaking should always qualify for a
Chevron analysis, even if it does not eventually earn Chevron deference,132 only a formal adjudication or an informal adjudication
that still allows the opposing side an opportunity to make its case
sufficiently high up in the agency will potentially qualify for Chevron deference.133

128. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46930, INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN
OVERVIEW 8 (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46930 [https://perma.cc/
M85R-9KNX].
129. For a discussion of the treatment of different types of rules on review, see supra
sections I.B and C.
130. Hicks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 909 F.3d 786, 804 (6th Cir. 2018) (“The APA distinguishes between formal adjudications, which must follow a set of ‘trialtype procedures,’ including ‘notice of “the matters of fact and law asserted,” an opportunity for “the submission
and consideration of facts [and] arguments,” and an opportunity to submit “proposed findings and conclusions” or “exceptions,”’ and informal adjudications, which ‘do not include
such elements.’”).
131. The significance of this type of intermediate level adjudication can be seen in the
adoption by the Administrative Conference of the United States of three categories of adjudications, labeled types A, B, and C. Type A adjudications are formal adjudications (some
would including highly formal yet still technically informal), Type C are highly informal,
and these common intermediate level adjudications are referred to as Type B. Administrative Conference of the United States, Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312,
94,314–15 (Dec. 23, 2016).
132. An agency can still be out of luck, however, if the court decides at the step zero
phase that the agency did not have delegated authority, such as occurred in FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
133. In a pre-Mead case the Court deferred to a letter issued by the Comptroller of the
Currency. Interestingly, this is exactly the type of situation where the “adverse party” in
the adjudication would not have contested it since the Comptroller was approving a license
to sell annuities for a bank (and in the process concluding more broadly “that national banks
have authority to broker annuities within ‘the business of banking.’”). See NationsBank of
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 255 (1995).

1262

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1239

The following section describes Chevron review of adjudication
at the Supreme Court and circuit court levels.
2. Examples of Chevron in Adjudication
Many of the Chevron related adjudication cases involve the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). This is not merely because
the BIA has such a heavy caseload, but because the BIA must frequently interpret ambiguous phrases in immigration statutes and,
as described in the first example below, has been given nearly a
carte blanche to do it by the Supreme Court. Both example cases
in this section involve the BIA, but they involve different immigration statutes.
In the first one, Aguirre, the immigrant was on track for deportation and petitioned for a withholding of deportation (so he would
not be deported).134 The relevant statute prohibited the attorney
general from deporting an alien “if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”135 However, this exception did not apply if the Attorney General determined that
“there are serious reasons for considering that an alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior
to the arrival of the alien in the United States.”136 The case is thus
discussing whether an exception applies to the otherwise mandatory relief from deportation.
In the second case, updated terminology meant that the alien
was now facing removal but the exception sought was not mandatory, as in the prior case, but a discretionary cancellation of removal.137 To even be eligible for this potential discretionary relief
the alien needed to, among other things, not have been convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude with a potential punishment
of at least a year.138 This case is therefore discussing whether the
alien was even potentially eligible for this discretionary relief.

134. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 418 (1999).
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1995) (amended 1996).
136. Id. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1995).
137. See Ortega-Lopez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2020).
138. Id. at 682–83.
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a. Chevron Review of Adjudication in the Supreme Court
I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre was a 1999 Supreme Court case that
dealt with whether Aguirre, a noncitizen,139 was entitled to withholding of deportation that would otherwise return him to Guatemala.140 While Aguirre claimed that he feared political persecution
if he returned, this would be irrelevant if he had ‘“committed a serious nonpolitical crime’ before his entry into the United States”
since the judge would have no discretion to withhold removal.141
Aguirre was alleged to have “burned buses, assaulted passengers, and vandalized and destroyed property in private shops, after
forcing customers out” to protest Guatemalan governmental policies.142 The Board therefore needed to determine whether these actions were enough to qualify as a prohibited “serious nonpolitical
crime.”143 It relied on a previous board opinion it had deemed precedential to determine that the “the criminal nature of the respondent’s acts outweigh their political nature” and therefore refused to
grant the withholding.144
When the case went to the Ninth Circuit on review, all parties
agreed that the term serious nonpolitical crime should be analyzed
by “weighing ‘the political nature’ of an act against its ‘commonlaw’ or ‘criminal’ character.”145 The question was whether the analysis should also consider other factors. The Ninth Circuit determined that the agency had erroneously failed to expand its analysis to include “‘the political necessity and success of Aguirre’s

139. Aguirre is referred to here by a single name since that is how it was done in the case
itself. He is also referred to as a noncitizen to state his status in as neutral a way as possible.
See Glossary of Immigration Terms, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, https://www.freedomforim
migrants.org/terminology [https://perma.cc/UWB8-Q4T8] (“Although ‘undocumented immigrant’ is not ideal nomenclature, we use it, ‘non-citizen’ or ‘non-status immigrant’ for lack
of better terms.”).
140. 526 U.S. 415, 418 (1999). There is evidence that the Court is moving away from
such aggressive deference to the BIA, but that does not appear to be followed in the lower
courts, which makes sense after reviewing the language from this opinion.
141. Id. The statutory section at issue in this case is 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 422.
145. Id. at 423. This drew, in part, from a prior BIA decision where the BIA had said “In
evaluating the political nature of a crime, we consider it important that the political aspect
of the offense outweigh its common-law character. This would not be the case if the crime is
grossly out of proportion to the political objective or if it involves acts of an atrocious nature.”
Id. at 422 (quoting Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, at 97–98 (B.I.A. 1984)). The BIA,
using that standard, had found that “the criminal nature of the respondent’s acts outweigh
their political nature.” Id.
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methods’; whether his acts were grossly out of proportion to their
objective or were atrocious; and the persecution respondent might
suffer upon return to Guatemala”146
In contrast, the BIA relied on language from a previous adjudication in a different case and said that it “rejected any interpretation of the phrase . . . ‘serious nonpolitical crime’ . . . which would
vary with the nature of evidence of persecution” the immigrant
would face when returned to their country of origin.147
The Supreme Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
was not proper, as it “confronted questions implicating ‘an agency’s
construction of the statute which it administers.’”148 This meant
the Ninth Circuit should have used Chevron deference, as the Attorney General was charged with interpreting immigration law
and the Attorney General had delegated that authority to the
BIA.149 This was particularly true, the Court said, because “judicial
deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
immigration context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive
political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’”150
Despite saying that the BIA’s determination was closer to the
language of the statute, the Court still proceeded through the full
Chevron analysis. Because the requirement that the immigrant
prove a risk of persecution was required to even be eligible for a
withholding of removal, the Court stated, “[i]t is reasonable to decide, as the BIA has done, that this factor can be considered on its
own and not also as a factor in determining whether the crime itself is a serious, nonpolitical crime.”151
Because the statute was ambiguous and the BIA’s interpretation
was reasonable, the Court deferred to the BIA and the interpretation announced in the adjudication was upheld.152

146. Id. at 418.
147. Id. at 425 (quoting Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 1985)).
The quoted section specifically references the relevant statutory section.
148. Id. at 424.
149. Id. at 425.
150. Id. (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)). The Court went on to say that
a “decision by the Attorney General to deem certain violent offenses committed in another
country as political in nature, and to allow the perpetrators to remain in the United States,
may affect our relations with that country or its neighbors. The judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such
diplomatic repercussions.” Id.
151. Id. at 426.
152. Id.
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b. Chevron Review of Adjudication in the Circuit Courts
A recent Ninth Circuit case demonstrates the degree to which
courts continue to defer to the BIA under Chevron. In Ortega-Lopez
v. Barr, Ortega-Lopez, a noncitizen, had pleaded guilty to “knowingly aiding and abetting another person who sponsored or exhibited an animal in an animal fighting venture.”153 While the case
was pending, removal proceedings were commenced against
him.154 Ortega-Lopez sought cancellation of his removal, an option
that was not possible if he had been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.155 “Crime involving moral turpitude” is an ambiguous phrase that the BIA has attempted to clarify through a caseby-case approach, determining in each case whether the conduct in
question does or not does qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.156
When the initial decision was appealed to the Board, it issued a
precedential option determining “that animal fighting under 7
U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude under the immigration laws because the commission of this
offense requires a culpable mental state and involves reprehensible conduct.”157
The Ninth Circuit initially remanded the decision to the BIA,
asking it to consider the issue further, as “harm to chickens is, at
first blush, outside the normal realm of [crimes involving moral
turpitude].”158 On remand the BIA expressed the same conclusion
at length in another precedential opinion—analogizing animal
fighting to incest and prostitution, conduct that society inherently
deems reprehensible.159

153. 978 F.3d 680, 683 (9th Cir. 2020) (referencing 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 684.
157. Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 99, 101 (B.I.A. 2013).
158. Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2016).
159. Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382, 386–87 (B.I.A. 2018) (“[B]ecause the
conduct encompassed in a violation of § 2156(a)(1) celebrates animal suffering for one’s personal enjoyment, it transgresses the socially accepted rules of morality and breaches the
duty owed to society in general.”) On this round, the BIA also specifically reiterated that its
decision should be deferred to by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 385 (“The Ninth Circuit has deferred to the manner in which we apply this definition through case-by-case adjudications
in order to ‘assess[] the character, gravity, and moral significance of the conduct’ in question.
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). As the court explained, this approach allows the Board to ‘draw[] upon its expertise as the single body
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When the case returned to the Ninth Circuit, the court upheld
the BIA’s interpretation, noting that it had “deferred to the BIA’s
approach of identifying ‘examples of the types of offenses that qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude,’ when the BIA sets out the
example in a published opinion.”160
Now convinced that the BIA had indeed carefully considered the
issue, evidenced by the reasoning and the fact that the BIA chose
to publish it and finding the interpretation reasonable for the ambiguous statutory phrase, the BIA decision was upheld.161 While
this case appears to be a relatively straightforward application of
Chevron, the fact that it was initially returned to the BIA, despite
the original opinion also being reasoned and published, indicates
the degree to which the court was uncomfortable with the interpretation but still felt bound by Chevron to defer.
3. Chevron Can Be Thought of as Deference an Agency Earns by
Using the Required Procedures
As described in sections II.A.1 and II.B.1, both rulemaking and
adjudication exist on a spectrum with different levels of formality.
In both instances, the agency will generally need to use a procedure
that provides increased protection for the public before the result
will be entitled to Chevron deference.
For rulemaking, which has specific, required procedures for even
informal (notice and comment) rulemaking, those informal procedures are generally the minimum expected of an agency before deference is available.162 Both case examples used for rulemaking review were reviewing regulations issued after notice and comment.
For adjudication, which does not have a similarly formalized
middle ground, the opposing side must generally have an
charged with adjudicating all federal immigration cases’ and ‘is precisely the type of agency
action the Supreme Court instructs is entitled to . . . deference.’ Id.; see also Mendoza v.
Holder, 623 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 2010).”).
160. Ortega-Lopez, 978 F.3d at 685 (“We have acknowledged that the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ is inherently ambiguous, and neither we nor the BIA have established any clear-cut criteria ‘for determining which crimes fall within that classification and
which crimes do not.’ Because the BIA has authority to interpret the term ‘crime involving
moral turpitude’ as used in the INA, interpretations provided by the BIA in published opinions are entitled to deference under Chevron.” (citations omitted)).
161. Id. at 692–93.
162. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (citing Reno v. Koray, 515
U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (“[I]nternal agency guideline, which is not ‘subject to the rigors of the
Administrative Procedure Act, including public notice and comment,’ entitled only to ‘some
deference.’”).
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opportunity to present its case to a high-level reviewer within the
agency. In both examples of adjudication review, the courts reviewed published decisions of the BIA, decisions that had been appealed to the BIA from lower-level administrative determinations.163
In either instance, whether an agency has earned Chevron deference corresponds very closely to whether the agency has put in
the required (generally more time-consuming) process. The agencies choose which rules will become formal regulations and which
opinions will become formal published (precedential) opinions.
Rules, like guidance documents, that are quicker to issue require
less effort on the part of the agency but, in turn, will not receive
Chevron deference on review.164 In contrast, an agency that is willing (or forced by statute) to undertake notice and comment rulemaking will emerge on the other end with a document entitled to
greater deference.165 The difference is not the substance of the rule
produced, it is the process by which that rule has been produced.166
Similarly, on the adjudication side, Chevron is more likely to be
earned when the adjudication has been reviewed by those highest
in the agency167 and when the opposing side has been given an opportunity to present its views,168 both factors that will lengthen the
process but that correspondingly entitle the agency to greater discretion upon review.169
This effectively allows the agency to choose the level of deference
desired when the document is reviewed. In a rulemaking, for

163. See supra section II.B.2.
164. E.g., Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
165. See id.
166. That said, a guidance document or other interpretation explicitly intended to avoid
the notice and comment process will often contain a disclosure that it is not intended to be
legally binding. For instance, the document discussed infra note 208 includes the phrase
“[p]lease be advised that the contents of this document do not have the force and effect of
law and are not meant to bind the public in any way.”
167. For example, the BIA is the “highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws.” Board of Immigration Appeals, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/KKW3-32L3]
(Sept. 14, 2021).
168. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-in-the
-united-states [https://perma.cc/ZKS7-3ZLK] (Sept. 16, 2021) (describing the adversary proceedings in immigration hearings.)
169. For BIA determinations, an additional factor is generally whether the Board has
chosen to make the decision a published (precedential) decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)
(2022).
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instance, if an agency wants to ensure Chevron deference for a rule,
it should go through notice and comment. Alternatively, if speed is
more important than deference, or review seems highly unlikely, a
guidance document that will not receive significant deference on
review could be the right choice. Either way, the determination of
which route to pursue (rulemaking vs. adjudication) is left to the
agency, as described in the following section.
4. Whether to Undertake a Rulemaking or an Adjudication Is a
Choice Left to the Agency
Just as agencies have a choice on how formal they want a given
rulemaking or adjudication to be, as described in the prior section,
they also have a choice on whether to proceed initially down a rulemaking or adjudication pathway.
The Supreme Court determined decades ago that the choice on
whether to proceed through an adjudication or a rulemaking on a
particular issue was a choice that would remain with the agency.170
This goes with the general understanding that agencies likely
know what makes the most sense in their particular situation. And
different agencies have adopted different approaches. For instance,
while most agencies have engaged in rulemaking through the notice and comment process, the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) has instead generally chosen to elucidate the requirements that companies have to their employees through a series of
adjudications,171 a choice that has received scholarly criticism for
decades172 but nevertheless been repeatedly upheld by the
courts.173
While the decision to allow agencies a choice in how to act was
commendable in the autonomy it granted agencies, the Supreme
Court unfortunately followed this line of thought and expanded
Chevron, a doctrine that was defendable on a rulemaking basis, to
adjudication,174 where many of the same safeguards were lacking.

170. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
171. See generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU
L. REV. 411 (2010) (describing the continued use of adjudication rather than rulemaking by
the NLRB in the face of near unanimous criticism).
172. E.g., Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking
vs. Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1469, 1471 (2015).
173. E.g., Nestle Dreyer’s Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 821 F.3d 489, 501 (4th Cir. 2016).
174. The extension was acknowledged by the Supreme Court three years after Chevron
was issued. NLRB v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987)

2022]

RETHINKING RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING

1269

Agency autonomy is an important goal, but it does not automatically follow that allowing agencies a choice of how to act should
automatically entitle agencies to equal deference regardless of the
method they choose to act through.
This is in fact the question at the heart of Mead, the post-Chevron case that established that not all agency action was automatically entitled to Chevron deference.175 Less formal and less authoritative agency determinations do not earn Chevron deference but
are correspondingly easier for an agency to produce.
This leaves the agency with a choice. An agency that believes
clarification is needed on a particular rule can chose to go through
the notice and comment process and feel confident that the result
of the process will be entitled to deference, or it can move much
faster, and with less oversight, to produce a guidance document or
something similar, knowing that the end result of that process will
not be entitled to Chevron deference. Currently an agency can also
choose whether to go through a sufficiently formal adjudication or
rulemaking and likewise receive Chevron deference. That should
no longer be the case, as Part III explains.
III. CHEVRON SHOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ADJUDICATION
As the previous section described, agencies are able to choose
whether to undertake a rulemaking or an adjudication to decide a
particular issue. Completing a rulemaking can take years as the
process includes public comment and greater agency oversight. If
the agency instead decides to undertake an adjudication it can do
so quickly, without public input, and without having anyone else
question its choice or point out potential problems. This determination can then be immediately applied to the adjudication in the
agency, and the result will be upheld on appeal using Chevron.
This Part argues why this should not be the case. It first goes into
greater detail about the problems with the current approach before
reiterating the need to restrict Chevron deference exclusively to
rulemakings.
(“[W]here ‘the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.’ [Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)].
Under this principle, we have traditionally accorded the Board deference with regard to its
interpretation of the NLRA as long as its interpretation is rational and consistent with the
statute.”).
175. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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A. Problems with the Current System
The current system suffers from both a lack of public notice and
public participation. This section describes why these two factors
are so important in the rulemaking process and how problematic
their absence from adjudication should be considered. Since the
problems are a lack of public notice and comment, the very definition of how most rules are made, that is the order in which they
are addressed in this section.
1. Agencies Can Bind the Public Without Public Notice
As described in section I.A, the Supreme Court generally grants
Chevron deference to agency action where the opposing side was
granted some meaningful opportunity to make its case. This in effect equates all the procedural protections of the rulemaking process to the due process considerations due to an individual.176 In
many adjudications not only is the public not aware what action
the agency is considering or the reasoning behind it, the individual
in the adjudication does not know ahead of time either.
This will undoubtedly result in instances where the individual
did not present the same arguments in the adjudication that they
would have presented if they had known what direction the agency
was planning to go in. In such cases in particular, a lone adverse
party cannot be said to effectively stand in for the public as in a
rulemaking.
In other instances, even if the individual might not know what
action the agency is considering ahead of time, it is possible that
the particular individual in the adjudication would not consider it
problematic. For instance, if the agency is creating a new multifactor test, but the individual can meet that test, they have little
reason to contest it, even if the test would be problematic if applied

176. The due process, if not the Due Process. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson,
Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 974 (2021) (“Indeed, retroactively announcing policy via adjudication presents two types of overlapping concerns—what we call
‘Due Process’ and ‘due process,’ with the former being actual constitutional violations and
the latter being the sort of government action that, while perhaps constitutional, nonetheless requires a clear statement from Congress because of its tension with traditional understandings of fairness and the rule of law. Both Due Process and due process matter. For
instance, there often is no constitutional prohibition on retroactive rulemaking; Congress
can authorize it. Yet courts understandably are reluctant to conclude that Congress has
done so.”).
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more broadly.177 It is never enough for one individual in an adjudication to speak for the public in general.
One individual will never represent every aspect of the broader
public that the rule will apply to. A precedential opinion that sets
forth a test the adverse party can meet is also highly unlikely to be
appealed, even though there may be good reasons that test should
not be broadly applied.
Notice to the public requires more than that one lone individual
was able to make their own case in an adjudication. In the notice
and comment process, the public at large must first be notified of
the potential agency action and the reasoning behind that action.178
This public notice can be particularly beneficial for those working on behalf of the often marginalized groups that are frequently
affected by the agencies that chose to operate in this manner. Many
immigrants, for instance, have little access to resources, and the
clinics or other voluntary aid programs designed to help are only
able to handle a fraction of the workload.179 These programs must
177. For instance, in Matter of S-L-H- & L-B-L-, the BIA determined that a noncitizen
had successfully excused her delayed appearance at a hearing under a totality of the circumstances review. 28 I. & N. Dec. 318, 324 (B.I.A. 2021). Previously, the Board had held
that traffic delays were insufficient. In re S-A-, Applicant, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1050, 1051 (B.I.A.
1997). In this case, however, the noncitizen was able to demonstrate that she had hired a
driver to take her but that traffic was exceptionally bad due to unusual snowfall in the area.
S-L-H- & L-B-L-, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 319–20 (B.I.A. 2021). The Board held that it was possible
for a petitioner to make such a showing but also took into account that she had been on time
at a number of prior appearances. Id. at 321 (“Other factors, such as prior attendance at
hearings, eligibility for relief from removal, and promptness in filing the motion to reopen
may shed light on whether the alien intended to appear on time or otherwise had an incentive to do so.”) Since she successfully met these requirements, she had little reason to argue
that similar circumstances could still impact someone coming for their first hearing, but
this is now a precedential opinion of the BIA. And it is not merely that she had little reason
to contest such factors, as she was trying to make a wholistic case, she recited them as
factors in her favor. Id. at 320 (“[R]espondent contends that her situation is exceptional
because she appeared at all prior hearings during a period of 9 months, the respondents
previously filed asylum applications with the Immigration Court, and she promptly filed a
motion to reopen.”). This is an entirely understandable position for someone to take in an
adjudication and further demonstrates the degree to which the arguments made in an adjudication by a lone individual do not function as an effective summary of what all other
individuals would say.
178. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
179. Counsel in immigration hearings is the responsibility of the noncitizen, and many
are unable to obtain counsel at all. This can make a major difference to the outcome. A
recent report illustrated the difference counsel can make. “Detained immigrants with counsel were nearly 11 times more likely to seek relief such as asylum than those without representation (32 percent with counsel versus 3 percent without).” INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN
SHAFER, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT 2 (2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/access_to_counsel
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work on an individual basis assisting each of their clients, but an
organization already stretched thin will not necessarily know
which cases it can be most effective on, or which cases will be determined to have precedential value, so the group cannot advocate
in a more effective manner.
Courts, including those within an agency, are also not bound by
the logical outgrowth rule.180 This means that courts can decide
cases based on arguments that were not made by either side, and
certainly were not argued against by the opposing view. In contrast, if an advocacy group is notified of action being considered in
a rulemaking it can use the knowledge gained from its broad representation to help explain potential problems with the rule in a
far broader manner than in a single adjudication, and the logical
outgrowth rule in rulemaking mandates that the public has been
on sufficient notice of the potential direction the agency action
would take that potential objections can be raised.
It is not just the public that is harmed by this lack of public notice, like those represented by the advocacy groups. The agency is
also harmed since it cannot receive the same quality of information, as described in the following section.
2. Agencies Can Bind the Public Without Public Comment
As discussed in the previous section, members of the public will
be unable to provide comment on agency action they are unaware
of. When this happens, the agency, and thereby the public the
agency works on behalf of, also loses out on the expertise that public comments bring to the agency.
Part of the rationale for Chevron is that agencies have superior
expertise to courts, but, as described in section II.A.1, an important

_in_immigration_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ9F-N7TM]. Not only were these immigrants more likely to seek relief, out of those who sought relief, they were more likely to
obtain it. Id. at 3 (“49 percent with counsel versus 23 percent without.”). The same effect
was seen with immigrants who were not detained as well. Id. at 2 (“Immigrants who were
never detained were five times more likely to seek relief if they had an attorney (78 percent
with counsel versus 15 percent without).”). And, like before, out of those who sought relief
they were much more likely to be successful. Id. at 3 (“63 percent with counsel versus 13
percent without.”).
180. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Allowing a single adjudication to stand
for the entire comment process also discounts the fact that the broad issues supposedly being addressed by these agency determinations will not necessarily be adverse to the individual who is the other party to the agency adjudication, and who might therefore not have
any reason to defend against the agency action.
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part of that expertise includes the information gathered from the
public during the comment process. This process allows the agency
an opportunity to stop and let the public preemptively check for
problems ahead of time.
When agencies act unilaterally, as they do when making binding
legal interpretations in an adjudication, they lose the additional
information that would otherwise have been contributed by the
public—information that can and does end up affecting the final
agency action in a rulemaking.
While public comments do not need to be acted on in the rulemaking process, in that the agency does not need to change course
based on them, the agency does need to at least respond to those
making substantive points.181 A view of agencies that assumes they
are trying to come to the “best” resolution would take it as a given
that this best resolution can only be reached with all relevant information, and a component of that relevant information in many
instances will be information provided by the public through comments.182
Acting through adjudication inherently bypasses this important
component of the traditional rulemaking process. While the Supreme Court has made statements indicating a belief that a lone
individual arguing their side suffices to provide an alternative
point of view,183 this is nevertheless antithetical to the rulemaking
process and should no longer be considered sufficient for Chevron
deference, as the following section explains.
B. Only Rules Should Be Eligible for Chevron Deference
Given the problems discussed in the prior sections regarding the
comparative public notice and input available in a rulemaking
compared to an adjudication, it does not make sense to grant the

181. See rulemaking discussion supra section II.A.1.
182. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and
the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1373
(1992) (“The accuracy and thoroughness of an agency’s actions are enhanced by the requirement that it invite and consider the comments of all the world, including those of directly
affected persons who are able, often uniquely, to supply pertinent information and analysis.”).
183. E.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (“[T]he BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through
a process of case-by-case adjudication’”).
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same deference to the results of an adjudication as to a notice and
comment rulemaking.184
This would not need to mean that an agency that determined
during an adjudication that there was an ambiguity in a statute
would have no option for deference. The problem could be solved if
agencies instead undertook a rulemaking when an ambiguity was
identified during an adjudication. That would solve both the lack
of public notice and the lack of public input before the agency
makes a final determination on its preferred approach.
Restricting Chevron deference to rulemakings, rather than rulemakings and adjudications as is currently allowed, would encourage agencies to engage in rulemaking.185 But merely requiring an
agency to undertake a rulemaking to earn Chevron deference
would not encourage the agency to pause an adjudication to pursue
a rulemaking because under current law the results of that rulemaking could not be used in the adjudication that initiated it, due
to the retroactivity ban for rulemaking.
Part IV discusses why an exception to this ban should be created
to enable an agency to actually use the results of a rulemaking in
the adjudication that prompted it, exactly as it would have been
able to do with a traditional legal determination in the adjudication that had not been vetted through the public comment process.
IV. ADJUDICATION-INITIATED RULES SHOULD BE APPLICABLE
RETROACTIVELY
Allowing Chevron deference only for rulemaking rather than for
rulemaking and adjudication would increase the incentive for
agencies to use rulemaking in many instances. However, it would
not provide a sufficient incentive for agencies to use rulemaking to
resolve issues that arise in an adjudication. The reason for this is
184. While the fact that Chevron has been applied to adjudications in the past would of
course mean that this new rule would necessitate a change in the law, changing a procedural
rule like Chevron review does not implicate the same concerns that other types of changes
can. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests
are involved, the opposite is true in cases . . . involving procedural . . . rules.” (citations omitted)).
185. This plea has been made by others as well. E.g., Hickman & Nielson, supra note
176 (arguing against the use of Chevron in rulemaking generally); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1201 (2021) (making the same argument specifically in the immigration context).
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that the resulting rule, under current law, could not be used in the
adjudication where that ambiguity mattered. Since the agency
would have no method of obtaining greater deference to the determination in that adjudication, it would be pointless for the agency
to pause the adjudication to engage in the rulemaking.
If, however, the results of such a rulemaking could be used in
the adjudication, the agency would have an incentive to pause the
adjudication to enable the general public to point out unforeseen
issues with the agency’s chosen approach or suggest possible previously unconsidered alternatives.186
This Part expands this argument. It starts by explaining why
retroactive rulemaking is generally prohibited before reiterating
the need for the limited exception advocated for here. It then discusses guardrails that would ensure the limited exception did indeed remain limited, and the safeguards that already exist to protect individuals in an adjudication from the unfair application of
retroactive rules. Next, it addresses how it would be possible for
agencies to handle the limited number of additional rules that
would be expected under the system proposed here and how the
system would not constrain agency discretion, before finishing
with a discussion on how these retroactive rules would still fit
within the APA definition of a rule.
A. The Rulemaking Retroactivity Prohibition
It would not be accurate to say that there is a complete ban on
retroactive rules.187 It is better described as a very strong
186. Using rulemaking rather than adjudication also makes it more likely that other
administrative agencies and the executive branch in general will have the opportunity to
point out potential problems with the agency’s chosen approach.
187. Even the term retroactive itself can become confusing, confusion that is not helped
by the attempted distinction between primary and secondary retroactivity. Primary retroactivity changes the past consequences of past actions (deciding that a prior act was a violation at the time it occurred). Secondary retroactivity only has a legal effect going forward.
For example, deciding “that for purposes of assessing future income tax liability, income
from certain trusts that has previously been considered nontaxable will be taxable—
whether those trusts were established before or after the effective date of the regulation.”
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 219 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Secondary retroactively is considered acceptable. It is okay that the individuals wish they had made
a different choice in the past, even if they are locked into something longer term. It is not
okay, however, to decide that nontaxable trusts should have been taxable in the prior tax
year and impose that tax now. Procedural rules as a general category can also be considered
secondarily retroactive. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994) (“Because
rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make
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presumption against retroactivity.188 This presumption can generally be overcome only by explicit statutory language indicating permissible retroactive application, although even then courts can be
hesitant to impose a rule retroactively.189
“Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals
should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform
their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be
lightly disrupted. For that reason, the ‘principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that
existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.’”190
In the vast majority of cases, retroactivity is prohibited in rulemaking and allowed in adjudication, as the definitions in the APA
could be interpreted to require.191 But this distinction is not as
clear cut as it is sometimes presented. Agencies can choose to apply
a rule retroactively and have it upheld on review192 as well as announce a new legal interpretation in an adjudication but only apply
the new interpretation prospectively (to future adjudications).193 It
application of the rule at trial retroactive.”).
188. Very strong indeed. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208–09 (1988) (“Retroactivity is not favored
in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed
to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result. By the same principle,
a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms. Even where some substantial justification for retroactive rulemaking is presented, courts should be reluctant to find such authority absent an
express statutory grant.” (citations omitted)).
189. This was the case in Bowen itself, where the Court was unwilling to find retroactive
rulemaking ability of the type used when the statute specifically said “provide for the making of suitable retroactive corrective adjustments.” Id. at 209 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(v)(1)(a)).
190. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno,
494 U.S. 827, 856 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). This concern is strongest when the past
actions were taken in reliance on a different rule. It can therefore make a difference whether
the rule changes as opposed to clarifies the law in a particular area.
191. The key stumbling point being the requirement that a rule have “future effect.” 5
U.S.C. § 551(4).
192. E.g., Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2006) (allowing a retroactive Social Security regulation to take effect).
193. This is, in effect, what was allowed to happen in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759, 763–65 (1969). The Court started with strong language condemning the actions of
the NLRB: The National Labor Relations Board created a new rule in an adjudication which
is said it would only apply prospectively. The Court said “The Board asks us to hold that it
has discretion to promulgate new rules in adjudicatory proceedings, without complying with
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. The rule-making provisions of that
Act, which the Board would avoid, were designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application. They may not be avoided by the process of making rules
in the course of adjudicatory proceedings. There is no warrant in law for the Board to replace
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nevertheless serves as one of the primary operating principles in
administrative law and would be the single largest barrier to enacting the type of rules proposed in this Article.
The following section describes why it would be so critical to allow these rules to apply retroactively.
B. Allowing Limited Retroactivity Is Necessary for These Rules to
Apply in Adjudications
As discussed in Part III, the fact that agencies effectively make
new law through adjudication without true public input is problematic and should not be entitled to the same level of deference on
review as the product of a notice and comment rulemaking. But, as
the prior section described, it is not enough to simply urge agencies
to undertake more rulemakings because the results of those rulemakings would not be usable in the adjudications that raised the
issue to begin with.
This is because when an agency makes a determination in an
adjudication, that determination can generally be immediately applied to the case at hand and will often determine what happens
the statutory scheme with a rule-making procedure of its own invention. Apart from the fact
that the device fashioned by the Board does not comply with statutory command, it obviously falls short of the substance of the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The ‘rule’ created in [Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966)] was not published
in the Federal Register, which is the statutory and accepted means of giving notice of a rule
as adopted; only selected organizations were given notice of the ‘hearing,’ whereas notice in
the Federal Register would have been general in character; under the Administrative Procedure Act, the terms or substance of the rule would have to be stated in the notice of hearing, and all interested parties would have an opportunity to participate in the rule making.
The Solicitor General does not deny that the Board ignored the rule-making provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act. But he appears to argue that Excelsior’s command is a
valid substantive regulation, binding upon this respondent as such, because the Board
promulgated it is the Excelsior proceeding, in which the requirements for valid adjudication
had been met. This argument misses the point. There is no question that, in an adjudicatory
hearing, the Board could validly decide the issue whether the employer must furnish a list
of employees to the union. But that is not what the Board did in Excelsior. The Board did
not even apply the rule it made to the parties in the adjudicatory proceeding, the only entities that could properly be subject to the order in that case. Instead, the Board purported to
make a rule: i.e., to exercise its quasi-legislative power.” Id. at 764–65 (citations omitted).
However, in the end the Court upheld the rule the NLRB had cited in another adjudication
(referencing the one in question) because the Board could have just as easily said it the
second time and that would have been valid. Id. at 766 (“Even though the direction to furnish the list was followed by citation to [the previous adjudication] it is an order in the
present case that the respondent was required to obey.”). And that was the state of affairs
fifteen years before Chevron further elevated the initial results of the first adjudication.
While adjudicatory boards do not often want to apply a new interpretation only prospectively, it does still happen occasionally. E.g., Beneli v. NLRB, 873 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir.
2017) (upholding a decision of the NLRB to only apply a new interpretation prospectively).
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based on past behavior. But rules generally cannot become effective until at least thirty days after the final rule has been published, so past behavior cannot be considered under a new rule.194
This is despite the fact that the notice and comment process would
include greater protection for the adverse party than the current
system.
That is why it is necessary to create a limited exception to allow
the rules created in these situations to apply to the adjudications
that gave rise to them. Given the limited nature of the rules that
would be promulgated based on the guardrails and safeguards discussed in the following sections, the resulting rule would not be
functionally different from simply allowing the agency to make the
determination in the adjudication, except that the rule would be
better informed since the public would have been able to provide
the agency with additional oversight on the implications of the
rule.
Without this retroactive ability, even if the agency is required to
conduct a rulemaking to receive Chevron deference, there would be
no way and no incentive to begin that process based on an issue
identified in an adjudication. Agencies would therefore continue
making what are effectively rules without the public input that is
so central to the rulemaking process.
But this would not be a free-for-all. As described in the following
two sections there would be guardrails and safeguards to make
sure the retroactive rulemaking ability could not be abused.
C. Guardrails Would Ensure that the Exception Remained
Limited
This Article argues that an exception should be made to allow
some rules to apply retroactively. However, this is not intended to
obliterate the generally prospective nature of rulemaking.
Instead, there would be constraints in place to make sure that
the exception remained limited. This exception has been designed
specifically to allow the decisions that are currently being made in
adjudications (without any public input) the opportunity to instead
be finalized after the public has had an opportunity to weigh in.
This section discusses these constraints, referred to as guardrails

194.

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
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here. These guardrails would be specific legal requirements for a
new rule to apply retroactively.
The newly created guardrails are intended to make clear that
this exception should apply only to new rules that are similar to
what agencies are already determining on their own in adjudication. Specifically, the agency would need to demonstrate two
things. First, the agency would have to be able to identify the adjudication where the issue was first raised. Second, the exception
would be limited to rulemakings focused exclusively on clarifying
a single issue in a statute.
Since the entire point of this exception is to allow an agency to
do in rulemaking what it was previously doing (or would otherwise
be doing) in an adjudication, a requirement that the issue originate
with an adjudication ensures that the exception applies only to instances that would otherwise have been determined in an adjudication itself, rather than issues the agency later identified on its
own as in need of clarification.
The agency would not be required to demonstrate that it first
became aware of the potential ambiguity during an adjudication.
This is because doing so would prevent agencies that had identified
something as a potential issue, but not necessarily one in need of
immediate clarification, from ever acting through rulemaking once
it became clear that clarification was needed. An agency would,
however, need to be able to show the issue had come up in an adjudication.
Second, the issue must involve interpretation of specific, limited
phrases from the statute. In many instances this would be expected
to be a single word or phrase that was in need of clarification. But,
because the previously unforeseen issue may instead involve the
interplay of different provisions of a statute, it would be overly limiting to require that a single word or phrase be identified. Instead,
this exception would be better thought of as a single issue in a statute that the rulemaking was designed to clarify.195
These two new requirements would prevent an agency from using this opportunity to lay out an entire regulatory plan, but the
requirements would not prevent an agency from determining that
clarification of the issue requires a multi-factor test. In contrast to
the guardrails, which would be new requirements, the following
195. Put another way, it is asking whether this is the kind of determination that could
have been made in an adjudication.
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section discusses already existing legal safeguards that would add
protection on a systemic as well as individual level.
D. Additional Existing Safeguards that Would Further Protect
Individuals in Adjudications from a Retroactive Rule
The guardrails discussed in the prior section would be specific
requirements that a rulemaking would need to meet for the resulting rule to be eligible for retroactive application. But those guardrails would not be the only factors preventing unfair retroactive
application of a rule. There are already a number of safeguards
built into the legal system on both a systemic and individual level
that would offer additional protection.
Systemically, retroactive application of a rule would still be tied
directly to the statute the rule originated from, and the effective
date of the statute would be the earliest possible application of the
retroactive rule (barring a separate retroactivity analysis for the
statute itself).196 An agency would not be able to go beyond its statutory authority when promulgating the rule. Just as it cannot now
create liability before the applicable date of a statute in an adjudication,197 it would not be able to do so under this proposal as well.
In other words, this limited exception does not open a magic door
to unlimited retroactivity for the agency.
Again, this comports with what agencies are currently permitted
to do under the law in an adjudication; the only difference would
be the requirement of the additional rulemaking. This leads to the
individual protections. First, the process as a whole would provide
better safeguards for the individuals affected by the rule. Second,
retroactivity would not be possible without an individual analysis
in that particular adjudication, granting further due process protection to the individual.

196. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (“When a case implicates a
federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of
course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would
have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.”).
197. E.g., Reyes-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 89 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Landgraf to an adjudication).
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One critical component of the rulemaking process is that the
broader public is given the opportunity to weigh in. In the type of
rule proposed here the public would include the individual in the
adjudication potentially affected by the rule, who would be able to
comment on the proposed rule along with other members of the
public. It would be an additional opportunity for the affected party
to make its case to the agency as to why an unfavorable interpretation should not be adopted and an opportunity for other members
of the community who could be similarly affected to make clear to
the agency the impact of the rule.
The individual would also likely be able to make a better case in
the rulemaking than in the adjudication, since the logical outgrowth rule means they would be required to know what the potential rule was.198
In an adjudication, the agency’s new legal interpretation will not
necessarily be known by the individual until after the completion
of the adjudication. By this point, if the individual seeks judicial
review of the decision, the agency’s determination could already be
entitled to Chevron deference.199 This deprives the individual of an
opportunity to explain to the agency why the agency’s proposed interpretation is incorrect. In a rulemaking, the logical outgrowth
rule requires that those affected have prior knowledge of the
agency’s proposed actions, enabling a more effective response.200
Building from this, in the continuation of an adjudication following a rulemaking of the type argued for here, the individual would
now know exactly what they needed to demonstrate and could put
their effort into arguing based on the new rule, rather than making
vague arguments based on past rules that the agency no longer
intended to stick to. While this might mean that the other party
knows they would have a more difficult time making the case if the
rule had changed in an adverse manner, they would still know
what they needed to prove, which would put them in a better position than they are currently in now in many instances.
Second, before a rule could be applied retroactively to an individual in an adjudication, an analysis would still need to be done
to see whether there would be an individual violation in that particular instance for the rule to apply retroactively. This analysis is
198. See supra section II.A.1.
199. This is true even if no one has had an opportunity to argue why that particular
interpretation is problematic.
200. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
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already done in adjudications when determining whether to apply
the newly created legal interpretation.201 If, for instance, the individual had received contrary advice from someone at the agency
that they had acted on, it might well be determined that applying
the rule retroactively in that particular circumstance would not be
appropriate.202 Since such an analysis is not always done in adjudications, applying the new rule as an actual rule rather than an
agency interpretation in an adjudication would again provide the
individual with greater protection.
Not only would the type of rulemaking discussed here be better
for an individual participating in an adjudication, it is a realistic
option for the agency as well, as described in the following section.
E. Agencies Would Be Able to Effectively Promulgate These Rules
Requiring agencies to undertake an additional process to obtain
deference would unquestionably create concern about the increased level of work. However, this section explains why the proposal in this Article is in fact feasible because it would apply to
relatively few rules, and the rules it would apply to would be expected to qualify for an expedited process.
1. Relatively Few Rules Would Be Affected by the Change
This Article proposes creating a limited exception to the general
prohibition against retroactive rulemaking.203 That does not mean,
however, that any rule would suddenly be applicable retroactively.
201. In De Niz Robles v. Lynch, the Tenth Circuit held that the BIA’s method of announcing new interpretations in an adjudication was in fact so similar to rulemaking, if upheld
using Chevron and Brand X, that it should be subject to the same retroactivity constraint.
De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015) (“While the Court has granted
agencies a fair amount of flexibility in choosing between rulemaking and adjudication, it
has long encouraged the former route because rulemaking offers more notice (due process)
and better protects against invidious discrimination (equal protection). Allowing agencies
the benefit of retroactivity always and automatically whenever they choose adjudication
over rulemaking would create a strange incentive for them to eschew the Court’s stated
preference for rulemaking—and render Bowen easily evaded.” (citations omitted)). The
Tenth Circuit even held that this prohibition would apply to a petitioner who had applied
before it was confirmed that the new interpretation was good law. Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 2016) (referring to the adjudication announcing a new
interpretation as an “exercise of delegated legislative policymaking authority”).
202. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding one
reason to side against implementing the agency’s preferred interpretation was that conflicting advice was being provided by regional offices).
203. This would apply in situations where the statute itself does not already explicitly
authorize retroactive rules.

2022]

RETHINKING RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING

1283

Instead, as discussed in the section on guardrails, section IV.C.,
there would be additional provisions in place that a rule would
need to meet before it could be applied retroactively. Not only
would the rule need to be traceable to an adjudication, it would also
need to be limited, as it could only address a single issue involving
a statute.
These requirements would inherently limit the scope of the potential rule. Since most rules do not arise from adjudications, and
very few are so specifically targeted, it would also mean that only
a small percentage of the total rules promulgated each year would
even potentially be eligible for retroactivity.
Therefore, not only would this exception therefore apply to a
small minority of the rules produced each year, the rules that it did
apply to would not be terribly burdensome for the agency to promulgate, as discussed in the following section.
2. These Rules Would Generally Be Subject to a Streamlined
Rulemaking Process
The rulemaking process that major rules must go through is
lengthy and complex, so much so that it has been decried for decades now as ossified.204 This has contributed to a larger fear of rulemaking among many, a fear that could similarly lead to an instinctive negative reaction to this proposal. But the rulemaking process
for the types of rules at issue here, the ones that the retroactivity
exception would apply to, would generally not require the full burdensome rulemaking process.
As described in section II.A.1., the most onerous rulemaking requirements, including the repeated review by the OMB, apply to
economically significant or other major rules. Not only do these
economically significant rules required additional lengthy steps in
OMB review, they require significantly more complicated documentation, since the agency must list alternative options and the
costs and benefits of each alternative option as well as justify the
option chosen.205 These big, economic rules are not specifically targeted rules that simply happen to have a large economic impact;
204. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the
Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493, 1498 (2012) (“Every study of economically significant rulemakings has found strong evidence of ossification—a decisionmaking process that takes many years to complete and that requires an agency to commit a high
proportion of its scarce resources to a single task.”).
205. See supra section II.A.1 (providing an overview of rulemaking).
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they are generally attempts to implement large sections of code,
such as the type of rulemaking required when a new statutory directive is passed.206 The agency must also not only draft the longer
rule but explain the reasoning for all parts of it in the preamble.207
The type of rules discussed in this Article, in contrast, would not
be implementing entirely new statutory provisions but, rather, interpreting single words or brief phrases within a statute.
As such, the rule itself would be faster to draft, since there would
only be one issue to determine as well as a similarly limited
amount of reasoning in the preamble. Additionally, it would be far
less likely to qualify as an economically significant rule, and therefore unlikely to need the analyses required for OMB review or full
OMB review itself, saving significant effort and time for the agency
and dramatically reducing the regulatory burden of the rule.
These rules are something agencies could do. But, as discussed
in the following section, they would not be made a procedural requirement, so agencies would still retain discretion.
F. Allowing These Retroactive Rules Would Not Constrain
Agency Discretion
Some might worry that requiring an agency to undertake a rulemaking to receive Chevron deference would inhibit agency discretion. After all, as described in section II.B.4, it has been established
for decades that the choice of whether to proceed with rulemaking
or with adjudication is a choice best left to the agency. Concern
would therefore be natural that changing the incentive structure
would take away the agency’s discretion.
But this confuses the agency’s right to decide what method to
use from the agency’s right to determine how the resulting action
will be viewed by a court, a right it does not possess.
Instead, when choosing to undertake a rulemaking or an adjudication it is also up to the agency to determine how much official
procedure to include in the process. In making the choice the
agency must balance a desire to act quickly and expeditiously with

206. E.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange and Insurance Market
Standards for 2015 and Beyond, 79 Fed. Reg. 15808 (proposed Mar. 21, 2014) (proposing a
number of new regulatory sections in response to requirements under the Affordable Care
Act).
207. See Bunk, supra note 68, at 55, 57.
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the understanding that greater procedures will likely lend the final
result greater deference. Agencies can move very quickly when issuing a guidance document, as the United States Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) did when issuing guidance on how states
could apply for Pandemic Electronic Benefit Transfer funds (“PEBT”), i.e., supplemental food assistance for children who were unable to access free and reduced-price lunches at school due to
COVID-19 related closures.208 The information was distributed in
the form of a guidance document, an ostensibly non-legally-binding
rule,209 and one that would not receive Chevron deference on review.
The Families First Coronavirus Response Act of 2020 was enacted on March 18, 2020.210 Two days later, on March 20, 2020, the
USDA sent out the corresponding guidance.211
This incredible speed would not have been possible through the
traditional rulemaking process.212 Getting information out to
states as quickly as possible was more important than making sure
that the agency would receive the highest level of deference on review.213
The fact that the level of deference on review would change depending on the method chosen does not affect the fact that the
choice on how to proceed is still left to the agency.
The impact on agency discretion would be different if the proposal in this Article was a call to invalidate any legal determinations made in an adjudication, but that is not what this Article proposes.
On the contrary, under this proposal an agency would still be
able to determine that it would not be worth the additional burden
to do a rulemaking in order to determine the meaning of an

208. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., STATE PLAN OF PANDEMIC EBT (P-EBT) (Mar. 20, 2020) (outlining how the appropriate state agencies can apply for aid).
209. Id. at 1 (“[T]he contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and
are not meant to bind the public in any way.”). That does not mean that guidance documents
cannot in many senses still be coercive.
210. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116–127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).
211. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 208.
212. Even using the faster version of rulemaking likely to be applicable for many of the
retroactive rules. See supra section IV.E.2.
213. Certainly it also helped that there was no particularly adverse party here who
would be likely to bring such a claim. The way the law was set up the states were not competing with each other but simply being told what they needed to do to get money to which
all states were equally entitled.
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ambiguous phrase in an adjudication and instead simply state the
new interpretation directly in the adjudication.214
If such a result were appealed, the agency simply would not receive Chevron deference. The order would not be sent back to the
agency as inherently procedurally invalid simply because the
agency had not undertaken a rulemaking.215 The only result would
be a reduced level of deference on review.
The discretion would remain with the agency, and the agency
would be able to act through any manner it is currently able to use.
The only change would be a change in the level of deference that
some adjudications would receive. This would affect the incentives
for the agency but not the right of the agency to determine the appropriate method.
Allowing the types of retroactive rules argued for here would
also not go against the definition of rule under the APA, as described in the following section.
G. These Rules Could Still Fit Within the Definition of a Rule
As discussed in section II.A.1., a rule is defined as “the whole or
a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect.” How would enabling retroactive rulemaking fit
with such a definition? Can there really even be such a thing as a
retroactive rule if a rule must have “future effect”?
Yes. While statutory clarification would undoubtedly solve this
issue, there are already instances where a retroactive rule has
been upheld.216 In addition, there is some support for the type of
extremely limited retroactivity exception envisioned in this Article.
In “the Government’s own most authoritative interpretation of the
APA,”217 the 1947 Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act,218 it was noted that “[n]othing in the Act

214. This is just like how agencies will at times chose to do a guidance document, even
though less deference will be due, because the time commitment required for a notice and
comment rulemaking cannot be rationalized.
215. In other words, it would not become a procedural requirement. See Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 961 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2020) (enabling a procedural challenge when
rulemaking occurred).
216. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
217. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
218. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT (1947).
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precludes the issuance of retroactive rules when otherwise legal
and accompanied by the finding required by [5 U.S.C. § 553(d)].”219
It would therefore still be possible to create such an exception
now. First, the statute does not say that rules must exclusively
have a future effect, and the types of rules proposed in this Article
would all be intended to be the rule of the agency going forward.
Even if the word exclusive is implicitly read into the statute, exceptions already exist such as with interpretive rules,220 indicating
that rulemaking, at least as a broad class, can have exceptions.
And the excerpt from the Attorney General’s Manual indicates that
in this type of rulemaking the agency would need to include a statement on the adjudicative origin of the rule and the consequent need
for the rule to have a retroactive effect. This would explain that
such a rule was required to have a retroactive effect to enable public participation in a process that otherwise unfairly excludes critical public input and thereby to better harmonize the process in
adjudications with the agency’s role in rulemaking.221
The exception proposed in this Article is also a harmless exception in that it would only provide greater protection to the other
party than is currently available. The entire process laid out in this
paper is intended to provide greater due process protection to an
individual in an adjudication if the agency also undertakes a rulemaking than the individual would have received merely going
through the adjudication itself.
The guardrails described in section IV.C. ensure that a rule applied to an individual in an adjudication could not be broader than
what the agency could have otherwise done directly in the adjudication itself. The safeguards described in section IV.D. further ensure that there would be an individual determination in each

219. Id. at 37 (“The required publication or service of any substantive rule. . . shall be
made not less than thirty days prior to the effective date thereof except as otherwise provided by the agency upon good cause found and published with the rule.”). This was, however, a logical leap that Justice Scalia was unwilling to make. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 219
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]part from the inexplicable reference to . . . 5 U.S.C. § 553(d),
which would appear to have no application.”). Even if he had made the connection, he appeared unwilling to accept it. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Moreover, the
clarity of [statements indicating exclusively future effect] cannot be disregarded on the basis
of the single sentence.”).
220. § 553(d)(2) (exempting interpretive rules from the 30 day notice requirement).
221. One that is designed to provide greater due process to individuals affected by administrative adjudicatory determinations while ensuring that the results reached were the
most informed possible.
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adjudication before a rule could be applied retroactively even if the
rule in question met the requirements of the guardrails.
Since these extra protections would ensure that the individual
would therefore not have been harmed by application of the rule
retroactively, the individual would have difficulty demonstrating
an injury regarding the application.
The exception does not harm the individual and would simply be
to allow the agency greater deference on those rules it chooses to
go through rulemaking with, deference earned given the increased
procedural protections present in the rulemaking process. The exception would not enable the agency to gain new adjudicatory powers.
CONCLUSION
By granting Chevron deference to administrative adjudications,
the judiciary has made adjudications more powerful than rulemaking, despite the inferior public participation and oversight that occurs in adjudications. To better enable true public participation
and the benefits that brings, agencies should be encouraged to commence a rulemaking when ambiguities are raised in an adjudication. But this option will only really be considered by agencies if
the resulting rule can be used immediately in adjudications, a result that will only be possible if the rule can be applied retroactively. Enacting the proposal in this Article would help bring the
participatory benefits of rulemaking into more situations, granting
the public increased access to agencies and agencies access to the
broader knowledgebase of the general public.

